

4.1
 1003a21 Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν καὶ
 τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν
 οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἢ αὐτῇ οὐδεμία
 γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ
 ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι
 1003a25 περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ
 μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δηλὸν ὡς
 φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὐτήν.
 εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες
 1003a30 ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ
 στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 ἀλλ' ἢ ὄν διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν τὰς
 πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.
 4.2
 Τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς
 ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ'
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν
 τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημείον
 εἶναι τῆς ὑγείας τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ
 1003b1 τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικὴν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν
 ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφρῆς εἶναι
 πρὸς αὐτήν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς),
 ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα
 1003b5 τούτοις, —οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς
 μὲν ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχὴν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι
 οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, τὰ
 δ' ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ
 ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν
 πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς
 1003b10 ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι μὴ ὄν
 φαμεν. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἀπάντων
 μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ' ἓν λεγομένων
 ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
 πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα
 1003b15 τρόπον τινὰ λέγονται καθ' ἓν. δηλὸν οὖν ὅτι
 καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι ἢ ὄντα. πανταχοῦ
 δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ
 ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι' ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ'
 ἐστὶν ἢ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ
 τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.

4.1 There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this part—this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then our predecessors who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.

4.2 There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study all things that are, qua being.—But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.

1028a9 Τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα
 πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς· σημαίνει
 γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν
 ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω
 κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ
 ὄντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὄν τὸ τί ἐστίν,
 1028a15 ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν
 ποιὸν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ
 τρίπηχυ ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστίν, οὐ λευκὸν
 οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ
 θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως
 ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες,
 1028a20 τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. διὸ καὶ ἀπορήσειέ
 τις πότερον τὸ βαδίζειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ
 καθῆσθαι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὃν σημαίνει, ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτουσιν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐδὲν
 γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ πεφυκὸς οὔτε
 χωρίζεσθαι δυνατόν τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον,
 1028a25 εἴπερ, τὸ βαδίζον τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὸ καθήμενον
 καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνον. ταῦτα δὲ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ὄντα,
 διότι ἔστι τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὠρισμένον
 (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον),
 ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ·
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἢ τὸ καθήμενον οὐκ ἄνευ τούτου
 1028a30 λέγεται. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην κακείνων
 ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὄν καὶ οὐ τί ὄν
 ἀλλ' ὄν ἀπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη. πολλαχῶς μὲν
 οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία
 πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν,
 αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον
 1028a35 (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας
 ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ' οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον
 μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστίν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γινώμεν ἢ τὸ
 1028b1 πῦρ, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν
 τί ἐστὶ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γινώμεν. καὶ δὴ καὶ
 τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ αἰεὶ
 ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τίς ἢ οὐσία
 1028b5 (τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐν εἶναι φασιν οἱ δὲ πλείω ἢ
 ἓν, καὶ οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένα οἱ δὲ ἄπειρα), διὸ
 καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς
 εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος θεωρητέον τί ἐστίν.

There are several senses in which a thing may be said to be, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense it means what a thing is or a 'this', and in another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which is primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or beautiful, but not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'man' or 'God'. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might raise the question whether 'to walk' and 'to be healthy' and 'to sit' signify in each case something that is, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or is seated or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them; and this is the substance or individual, which is implied in such a predicate; for 'good' or 'sitting' are not used without this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not is something) must be substance.

Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be primary; but substance is primary in every sense—in formula, in order of knowledge, in time. For of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. And in formula also this is primary; for in the formula of each term the formula of its substance must be present. And we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we know each of these things also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.

And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.

1028b8 Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν
τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τὰ τε ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ
μόρια αὐτῶν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ
σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν
τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἢ μόρια τούτων ἢ
ἐκ τούτων ἐστίν, ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἷον ὁ τε
οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη
καὶ ἥλιος)· πότερον δὲ αὐταὶ μόναι οὐσῖαι εἰσὶν ἢ
1028b15 καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων
μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δὲ τινες, σκεπτέον. δοκεῖ δὲ
τισι τὰ τοῦ σώματος πέρατα, οἷον ἐπιφάνεια καὶ
γραμμὴ καὶ στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, εἶναι οὐσῖαι, καὶ
μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ στερεόν. ἔτι παρὰ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον,
οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα αἴδια, ὥσπερ
1028b20 Πλάτων τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο
οὐσῖαι, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων
οὐσίαν, Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας,
ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα
ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς
1028b25 οὐσίας. ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα,
γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ. περὶ δὲ τούτων
τί λέγεται καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς, καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν
οὐσῖαι, καὶ πότερον εἰσὶ τινες παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς
1028b30 ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶ, καὶ αὐταὶ πῶς εἰσὶ, καὶ πότερον ἔστι
τις χωριστὴ οὐσία, καὶ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς, ἢ οὐδεμία,
παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς, σκεπτέον, ὑποτυπωσαμένοις
τὴν οὐσίαν πρῶτον τί ἐστίν.

Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that both animals and plants and their parts are substances, and so are natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or some of these and some other things are substances, or none of these but only some other things, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid. Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real, e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance—the Forms and the objects of mathematics—as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and making principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and other things come after them, e.g. lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the heavens and to sensible bodies.

Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what things are substances, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.

1017a7 Τὸ ὄν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν, οἷον
τὸν δίκαιον μουσικὸν εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον μουσικὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον,
παραπλησίως λέγοντες ὡσπερὶ τὸν μουσικὸν
οἰκοδομεῖν ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ μουσικῶ
εἶναι ἢ τῷ μουσικῶ οἰκοδόμῳ (τὸ γὰρ τὸδε
εἶναι τὸδε σημαίνει τὸ συμβεβηκέναι τῷδε
τὸδε), – οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων· τὸν
γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν καὶ τὸν
1017a15 μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ τὸν λευκὸν μουσικὸν
ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ
συμβεβήκασι, τὸ δ' ὅτι τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε, τὸ
δὲ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι τούτῳ τὸ μουσικὸν
συμβέβηκεν (οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ λευκὸν
εἶναι, ὅτι ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο ἔστιν)· – τὰ
1017a20 μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι λεγόμενα οὕτω
λέγεται ἢ διότι τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντι ἄμφω ὑπάρχει,
ἢ ὅτι ὄντι ἐκείνῳ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἔστιν ᾧ
ὑπάρχει οὐ αὐτὸ κατηγορεῖται· καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ
εἶναι λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς
κατηγορίας· ὅσαχῶς γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς
1017a25 τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων
τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ
ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἐκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι
ταῦτ' σημαίνει· οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἄνθρωπος
ὑγιαίνων ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ
1017a30 ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄνθρωπος
βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές, τὸ
δὲ μὴ εἶναι ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθές ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως
ἐπὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, οἷον ὅτι ἔστι
Σωκράτης μουσικός, ὅτι ἀληθές τοῦτο, ἢ ὅτι
ἔστι Σωκράτης οὐ λευκός, ὅτι ἀληθές· τὸ δ'
οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ διάμετρος σύμμετρος, ὅτι ψεῦδος.
1017b1 ἔτι τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ ὄν τὸ μὲν δυνάμει
ῥητὸν τὸ δ' ἐντελεχεία τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων·
ὁρῶν τε γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ὁρῶν
καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχεία, καὶ [τὸ] ἐπίστασθαι ὡσαύτως
καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ
1017b5 χρώμενον, καὶ ἡρεμοῦν καὶ ᾧ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἡρεμία
καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον ἡρεμεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
οὐσιῶν· καὶ γὰρ Ἑρμῆν ἐν τῷ λίθῳ φημέν εἶναι,
καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ σίτον τὸν μήπω
ἀδρόν. πότε δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ πότε οὕπω, ἐν ἄλλοις
διοριστέον.

Things are said to be (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.

(1) In an accidental sense, e.g., we say the just is musical, and the man is musical and the musical is a man, just as we say the musical builds, because the builder happens to be musical or the musical happens to be a builder; for here 'one thing is another' means 'one is an accident of another'. So in the cases we have mentioned; for when we say the man is musical and the musical is a man, or the white is musical or the musical is white, the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is; while the musical is a man means that musical is an accident of man. In this sense, too, the not-white is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is. Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.

(2) Those things are said in their own right to be that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its place, others its time, 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man recovers', nor between 'the man is walking' or 'cutting' and 'the man walks' or 'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.

(3) 'Being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not being' that it is not true but false,—and this alike in affirmation and negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that this is true, or 'Socrates is not-white' means that this is true; but 'the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side' means that it is false to say it is.

(4) Again, 'being' and 'that which is', in these cases we have mentioned, sometimes mean being potentially, and sometimes being actually. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is seeing, and both of that which can use knowledge and of that which is using it, that it knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained elsewhere.

Metaphysics 5.8

1017b10 Οὐσία λέγεται τά τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον γῆ
καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅλως
σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα ζῶα τε καὶ
δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων· ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα
λέγεται οὐσία ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὁ
1017b15 ἂν ἦ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, ἐνυπάρχον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις
ὅσα μὴ λέγεται καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ τῶ
ζῶῳ. ἔτι ὅσα μόρια ἐνυπάρχοντά ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς
τοιούτοις ὀρίζοντά τε καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνοντα, ὧν
ἀναιρουμένων ἀναιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον, οἷον ἐπιπέδου
σῶμα, ὡς φασί τινες, καὶ ἐπίπεδον γραμμῆς·
1017b20 καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ εἶναί τισι τοιοῦτος
(ἀναιρουμένου τε γὰρ οὐδὲν εἶναι, καὶ ὀρίζειν
πάντα)· ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐ ὁ λόγος ὀρισμός,
καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου. συμβαίνει
δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι, τό
θ' ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, ὁ μῆκέτι κατ' ἄλλου
1017b25 λέγεται, καὶ ὁ ἂν τόδε τι ὄν καὶ χωριστὸν ἦ·
τοιούτων δὲ ἐκάστου ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος.

We call substances: (1) the simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.

(2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of animals.

(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.

(4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.

It follows, then, that substance has two senses, (a) the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else, and (b) that which is a 'this' and separable—and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing.

Metaphysics 9.1

1045b27 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος καὶ πρὸς
ὁ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος
ἀναφέρονται εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ
γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τᾶλλα ὄντα,
1045b30 τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ οὕτω
λεγόμενα· πάντα γὰρ ἔξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον,
ὥσπερ εἶπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις)· ἐπεὶ δὲ
λέγεται τὸ ὄν τὸ μὲν τὸ τί ἦ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ
κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον,
1045b35 διορίσωμεν καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας,
καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δυνάμεως ἢ λέγεται μὲν
μάλιστα κυρίως, οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι
1046a1 πρὸς ὁ βουλόμεθα νῦν· ἐπὶ πλέον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ
δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων
κατὰ κίνησιν. ἀλλ' εἰπόντες περὶ ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς
περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσομεν καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

We have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred—i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the formula of substance that the others are said to be quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to contain the formula of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since 'being' is in one way divided into 'what', quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potentiality and fulfillment, and of function, let us discuss potentiality and fulfillment. First let us explain potentiality in the strictest sense, which is, however, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potentiality and actuality extend further than the mere sphere of motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality explain the other kinds of potentiality.

1046a4 ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ
τὸ δύνασθαι, διώριστα ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις· τούτων
δ' ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις
ἀφείσθωσαν (ἔναι γὰρ ὁμοιότητί τιμι λέγονται,
καθάπερ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα
λέγομεν τῷ εἶναι πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ
1046a10 καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἢ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ
μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι
ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο·
ἢ δ' ἔξισ ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς
1046a15 τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς.
ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς
πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος. πάλιν δ' αὐταὶ δυνάμεις
λέγονται ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ [τοῦ] παθεῖν
ἢ τοῦ καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις
ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν προτέρων δυνάμεων
1046a20 λόγοι. φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις
τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ
τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο
ὑπ' αὐτοῦ), ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ
πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι
καὶ τὴν ὑλὴν ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ πάσχον, καὶ
ἄλλο ὑπ' ἄλλου· τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ
1046a25 δ' ὑπέικον ὠδὶ θλαστὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων), ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ
ἢ οἰκοδομική, ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἢ δ' ἐν
τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ· διὸ ἢ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει
αὐτὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἐν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο. καὶ ἢ
ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον ἢ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει
1046a30 ἐναντία στερησίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ
τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμία. ἢ δὲ στερησίς
λέγεται πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ
πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ ἔχη, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ
ἢ ὠδί, οἷον παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὀπωσοῦν. ἐπ' ἐνίων
1046a35 δέ, ἂν πεφυκότεα ἔχειν μὴ ἔχη βία, ἐστερηῆσθαι
ταῦτα λέγομεν.

We have pointed out elsewhere that 'potentiality' and the word 'can' have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potentialities that are so called homonymously. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry; and we say things can be or cannot be because in some definite way they are or are not.

But all potentialities that conform to the same type are starting points, and are called potentialities in reference to one primary kind, which is a starting-point of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potentiality for being acted on, i.e. the principle in the very thing acted on, which makes it capable of being changed and acted on by another thing or by itself regarded as other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other, i.e. by a principle of change. In all these definitions is contained the formula of potentiality in the primary sense.—And again these so-called potentialities are potentialities either of acting merely or of being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potentiality are somehow contained.

Obviously, then, in a sense the potentiality of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be capable either because it can be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potentialities are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain motive principle, and because even the matter is a motive principle, that the thing acted on is acted on, one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily is inflammable, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potentiality is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things. And want of potentiality, or powerlessness, is the privation which is contrary to potentiality of this sort, so that every potentiality belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding want of potentiality. Privation has several senses; for it means that which has not a certain quality and that which might naturally have it but has not got it, either in general of when it might naturally have it, and either in some particular way, e.g. when it completely fails to have it, or when it in any degree fails to have it. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they suffer privation.

1048a25 Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ κίνησιν λεγομένης
 δυνάμεως εἴρηται, περὶ ἐνεργείας διορίσωμεν τί τέ
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ποῖόν τι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν
 ἅμα δῆλον ἐστὶν διαιρουῶσιν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦτο
 λέγομεν δυνατόν ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖν ἄλλο ἢ κινεῖσθαι
 1048a30 ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἐτέρως, διὸ ζητοῦντες καὶ περὶ τούτων διήλθομεν.
 ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως
 ὡσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει· λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει οἶον
 ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν,
 ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεὶς ἂν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ
 θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατός ἢ θεωρησῶν· τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖα.
 1048a35 δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ
 βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν
 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνοραῖν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ
 1048b1 οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορῶν
 πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὄρων πρὸς τὸ μῶνον
 μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς
 ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειρασμένον πρὸς
 τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρω
 1048b5 μορίῳ ἔστω ἢ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρω δὲ
 τὸ δυνατόν. λέγεται δὲ ἐνεργεῖα οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως
 ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἀνάλογον, ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πρὸς
 τοῦτο, τόδ' ἐν τῷδε ἢ πρὸς τόδε· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς
 κινήσεις πρὸς δυνάμιν τὰ δ' ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινα
 1048b10 ὕλην. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ κενόν, καὶ
 ὅσα τοιαῦτα, λέγεται δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργεῖα <ἢ>
 πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἶον τῷ ὄρωντι καὶ βαδίζοντι
 καὶ ὀρωμένῳ. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἀπλῶς
 ἀληθεύεσθαι ποτε (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρώμενον ὅτι
 ὀρᾶται, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὀρᾶσθαι δυνατόν)· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον
 1048b15 οὐχ οὕτω δυνάμει ἐστὶν ὡς ἐνεργεῖα ἐσόμενον
 χωριστόν, ἀλλὰ γνώσει. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπολείπειν τὴν
 διαίρεσιν ἀποδίδωσι τὸ εἶναι δυνάμει ταύτην τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζεσθαι οὐ.
 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία
 τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἶον τὸ ἰσχυραίνειν
 1048b20 ἢ ἰσχυρασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ὅταν ἰσχυραίνῃ οὕτως
 ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἢ
 κινήσεις, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πράξεις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ
 γὰρ τέλος)· ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ἢ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος
 καὶ [ἢ] πράξις. οἶον ὀρᾶ ἅμα <καὶ ἐώρακε,> καὶ
 φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ
 1048b25 ὑγίασται. εὖ ζῆ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ
 καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν.

Since we have treated of the kind of potentiality which is related to movement, let us discuss actuality, what and what sort of thing it is. In the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to the potential, that we not only ascribe potentiality to that whose nature it is to move something else, either without qualification or in some particular way, but also use the word in another sense, in the pursuit of which we have discussed these previous senses. Actuality means the existence of the thing, not in the way which we express by 'potentially'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and even the man who is not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable of studying. Otherwise, actually. Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy,—that as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which is shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought.

Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potentiality, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.

The infinite and the void and all similar things are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that in which many other things are said so to exist, e.g. that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter class these predicates can at some time be truly asserted without qualification; for the seen is so called sometimes because it is being seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen. But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; its separateness is only in knowledge. For the fact that division never ceases to be possible gives the result that this actuality exists potentially, but not that it exists separately.

Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the process of making thin is of this sort, and the things themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that in which the end is present is an action. E.g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought: but it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured. At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy.

Metaphysics 9.6 (cont.)

1048b26 εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχυραίνῃ,
νῦν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ζῆ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὲ <δεῖ>
τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα
γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυρασία μάθησις βάδισις
1048b30 οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ
γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβήαδουκεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ
ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίνεταί καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται
καὶ κενεῖται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κενεῖται
ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὄρα ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ
1048b35 νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνεργεῖαν λέγω,
ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργεῖα τί τέ ἐστι καὶ
ποιῶν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δήλον ἡμῶν ἔστω.

If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases: but, as it is, it does not cease; we are living and have lived. Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete—making thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete movements. For it is not true that at the same time we are walking and have walked, or are building and have built, or are coming to be and have come to be—it is a different thing that is being moved and that has been moved, and that is moving and that has moved; but it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.

Nicomachean Ethics 10.4 [1174a13–1174b8]

1174a13 Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποιῶν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν
ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ'
ὄντιν οὖν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεῆς
οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς
τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γὰρ τι
ἐστί, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβει τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς
ἐπὶ πλείῳ χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος.
1174a20 διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστὶν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις
καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν
ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ τούτῳ.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ
ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν
λίθων σύνθεσις ἕτερα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ραβδώσεως, καὶ
1174a25 αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ
τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς πρὸς τὸ προκειμένον), ἡ
δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους
γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει,
ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως
1174a30 καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν
ποιῶν, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτήσις βάδισις
ἄλλισι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποιῶν οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν
τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν
ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τῆνδε κάκεινην·
1174b1 οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης. δι' ἀκριβείας
μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ'
οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ
1174b5 ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποιῶν
εἰδοποιῶν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ
εἶδος. δήλον οὖν ὡς ἕτερά τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ
τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ,
ἢ δεσθαι δὲ τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὅλον τι.

What pleasure is, or what kind of thing it is, will become plainer if we take up the question again from the beginning. Seeing seems to be at any moment complete, for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will complete its form; and pleasure also seems to be of this nature. For it is a whole, and at no time can one find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. For this reason, too, it is not a movement. For every movement (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at the final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. For the fitting together of the stones is different from the fluting of the column, and these are both different from the making of the temple; and the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks nothing with a view to the end proposed), but the making of the base or of the triglyph is incomplete; for each is the making of a part. They differ in kind, then, and it is not possible to find at any and every time a movement complete in form, but if at all, only in the whole time. So, too, in the case of walking and all other movements. For if locomotion is a movement from here to there, it, too, has differences in kind—flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only so, but in walking itself there are such differences; for the whence and whither are not the same in the whole racecourse and in a part of it, nor in one part and in another, nor is it the same thing to traverse this line and that; for one traverses not only a line but one which is in a place, and this one is in a different place from that. We have discussed movement with precision in another work, but it seems that it is not complete at any and every time, but that the many movements are incomplete and different in kind, since the whence and whither give them their form. But of pleasure the form is complete at any and every time. Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole.

200b12 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ
 μεταβολῆς, ἢ δὲ μέθοδος ἡμῖν περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι,
 δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστὶ κίνησις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ
 ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν.
 200b15 διορισμένοις δὲ περὶ κινήσεως πειρατέον τὸν
 αὐτὸν ἐπελθεῖν τρόπον περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς. δοκεῖ
 δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον
 ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς
 ὀριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρησασθαι
 200b20 πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς τὸ εἰς
 ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὄν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
 ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησις ἀδύνατον
 εἶναι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς διὰ τε ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τὸ
 πάντων εἶναι κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου ταῦτα, σκεπτέον
 προχειρισμένοις περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων (ὕστερα
 γὰρ ἢ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων θεωρία τῆς περὶ τῶν κοινῶν
 200b25 ἐστίν)· καὶ πρῶτον, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν, περὶ
 κινήσεως. ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεῖα μόνον,
 τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεῖα, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ
 δὲ τοσόδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως. τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τι
 τὸ μὲν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λέγεται καὶ κατ' ἔλλειψιν,
 200b30 τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ παθητικόν, καὶ
 ὅλως κινητικόν τε καὶ κινητόν· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν
 κινητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ καὶ τὸ κινητόν κινητὸν
 ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ
 πράγματα· μεταβάλλει γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ
 κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν ἢ κατὰ
 τόπον, κοινὸν δ' ἐπὶ τούτων οὐδὲν ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὡς
 201a1 φαμέν, ὃ οὔτε τόδε οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ποιὸν οὔτε
 τῶν ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθέν· ὥστ' οὐδὲ
 κίνησις οὐδὲ μεταβολὴ οὐθενὸς ἔσται παρὰ τὰ
 εἰρημένα, μηθενὸς γε ὄντος παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.
 201a5 ἕκαστον δὲ διχῶς ὑπάρχει πᾶσι, οἷον τὸ τόδε (τὸ
 μὲν γὰρ μορφὴ αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ στέρησις), καὶ κατὰ
 τὸ ποιόν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν τὸ δὲ μέλαν), καὶ
 κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν τέλειον τὸ δ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν φορὰν τὸ μὲν ἄνω τὸ δὲ κάτω,
 ἢ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον τὸ δὲ βαρύ. ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ
 μεταβολῆς ἔστω εἶδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος.
 201a10 διηρημένου δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τοῦ μὲν
 ἐντελεχεῖα τοῦ δὲ δυνάμει, ἢ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος
 ἐντελέχεια, ἢ τοιοῦτον, κινήσις ἐστίν, οἷον τοῦ
 μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ἢ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοιώσις, τοῦ δὲ
 αὔξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ
 ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησης καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ
 201a15 δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ
 φορητοῦ φορά.

Nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown.

When we have determined the nature of motion, our task will be to attack in the same way the terms which come next in order. Now motion is supposed to belong to the class of things which are continuous; and the infinite presents itself first in the continuous—that is how it comes about that the account of the infinite is often used in definitions of the continuous; for what is infinitely divisible is continuous. Besides these, place, void, and time are thought to be necessary conditions of motion.

Clearly, then, for these reasons and also because the attributes mentioned are common to everything and universal, we must first take each of them in hand and discuss it. For the investigation of special attributes comes after that of the common attributes.

To begin then, as we said, with motion. Some things are in fulfilment only, others in potentiality and in fulfilment—one being a 'this', another so much, another such and such, and similarly for the other categories of being. The term 'relative' is applied sometimes with reference to excess and defect, sometimes to agent and patient, and generally to what can move and what can be moved. For what can cause movement is relative to what can be moved, and vice versa.

There is no such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything common to these which is neither 'this' nor quantity nor quality nor any of the other predicates. Hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned; for there is nothing over and above them.

Now each of these belongs to all its subjects in either of two ways: namely, substance—the one is its form, the other privation; in quality, white and black; in quantity, complete and incomplete. Similarly, in respect of locomotion, upwards and downwards or light and heavy. Hence there are as many types of motion or change as there are of being.

We have distinguished in respect of each class between what is in fulfilment and what is potentially; thus the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such, is motion—e.g. the fulfilment of what is alterable, as alterable, is alteration; of what is increasable and its opposite, decreasable (there is no common name for both), increase and decrease; of what can come to be and pass away, coming to be and passing away; of what can be carried along, locomotion.

201a15 ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις, ἐντεῦθεν δῆλον.
 ὅταν γὰρ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, ἢ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ
 λέγομεν εἶναι, ἐντελεχεία ἢ, οἰκοδομεῖται, καὶ
 ἔστιν τοῦτο οἰκοδόμησις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μάθησις
 καὶ ἰάτρευσις καὶ κύλισις καὶ ἄλσις καὶ ἄδρυνσις
 201a20 καὶ γήρανσις. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμει
 καὶ ἐντελεχεία ἐστίν, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ἢ οὐ κατὰ τὸ
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' οἷον θερμὸν μὲν ἐντελεχεία ψυχρὸν
 δὲ δυνάμει, πολλὰ ἤδη ποιήσει καὶ πείσεται ὑπ'
 ἀλλήλων· ἅπαν γὰρ ἔσται ἅμα ποιητικὸν καὶ
 201a25 παθητικόν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ κινεῖν φυσικῶς κινήτόν·
 πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον κινεῖ κινούμενον καὶ αὐτό.
 δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν τισιν ἅπαν κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινεῖν, οὐ
 μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ τούτου μὲν ἐξ ἄλλων ἔσται δῆλον
 ὅπως ἔχει (ἔστι γὰρ τι κινεῖν καὶ ἀκίνητον), ἡ δὲ
 τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος <ἐντελέχεια>, ὅταν ἐντελεχεία
 ὄν ἐνεργῆ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ἢ κινήτόν, κίνησις
 ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἢ ὡδί. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ χαλκὸς
 201a30 δυνάμει ἀνδριάς, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐχ ἢ τοῦ χαλκοῦ
 ἐντελέχεια, ἢ χαλκός, κίνησις ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ τὸ
 αὐτὸ τὸ χαλκῶ εἶναι καὶ δυνάμει τινί [κινήτῳ],
 ἐπεὶ εἰ ταῦτόν ἦν ἀπλῶς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἦν
 ἂν ἢ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, ἢ χαλκός, ἐντελέχεια κίνησις·
 οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ ταῦτόν, ὡς εἴρηται (δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ
 201b1 τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ὑγιαίνειν καὶ
 δύνασθαι κάμνειν ἕτερον – καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ κάμνειν
 καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ταῦτόν ἦν – τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον
 καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν, εἴθ' ὑγρότης εἴθ'
 αἷμα, ταῦτόν καὶ ἔν). ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταῦτόν, ὥσπερ
 οὐδὲ χρῶμα ταῦτόν καὶ ὄρατόν, ἢ τοῦ δυνατοῦ, ἢ
 201b5 δυνατόν, ἐντελέχεια φανερόν ὅτι κίνησις ἐστίν.
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστίν αὕτη, καὶ ὅτι συμβαίνει τότε
 κινεῖσθαι ὅταν ἢ ἐντελέχεια ἢ αὕτη, καὶ οὔτε
 πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον, δῆλον· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
 ἕκαστον ὅτε μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὅτε δὲ μὴ, οἷον τὸ
 οἰκοδομητόν, καὶ ἢ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια,
 201b10 ἢ οἰκοδομητόν, οἰκοδόμησις ἐστίν (ἢ γὰρ
 οἰκοδόμησις ἢ ἐνέργεια [τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ] ἢ ἢ
 οἰκία· ἀλλ' ὅταν οἰκία ἦ, οὐκέτ' οἰκοδομητόν
 ἔστιν· οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν· ἀνάγκη
 οὖν οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι)· ἢ δ'
 201b15 οἰκοδόμησις κίνησις τις. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς
 ἐφαρμόσει λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων.

That this is what motion is, is clear from what follows: when what is buildable, in so far as we call it such, is in fulfilment, it is being built, and that is building. Similarly with learning, doctoring, rolling, jumping, ripening, aging.

The same thing can be both potential and fulfilled, not indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially hot and actually cold. Hence such things will act and be acted on by one another in many ways: each of them will be capable at the same time of acting and of being acted upon. Hence, too, what effects motion as a natural agent can be moved: when a thing of this kind causes motion, it is itself also moved. This, indeed, has led some people to suppose that every mover is moved. But this question depends on another set of arguments, and the truth will be made clear later. It is possible for a thing to cause motion, though it is itself incapable of being moved.

It is the fulfilment of what is potential when it is already fulfilled and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. What I mean by 'as' is this: bronze is potentially a statue. But it is not the fulfilment of bronze as bronze which is motion. For to be bronze and to be a certain potentiality are not the same. If they were identical without qualification, i.e. in definition, the fulfilment of bronze as bronze would be motion. But they are not the same, as has been said. (This is obvious in contraries. To be capable of health and to be capable of illness are not the same; for if they were there would be no difference between being ill and being well. Yet the subject both of health and of sickness—whether it is humour or blood—is one and the same.)

We can distinguish, then, between the two—just as colour and visible are different—and clearly it is the fulfilment of what is potential as potential that is motion.

It is evident that this is motion, and that motion occurs just when the fulfilment itself occurs, and neither before nor after. For each thing is capable of being at one time actual, at another not. Take for instance the buildable: the actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality must be either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable is no longer there. On the other hand, it is the buildable which is being built. Necessarily, then, the actuality is the process of building. But building is a kind of motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also.

416b32 Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ
πάσης αἰσθήσεως. ἢ δ' αἰσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαι τε
καὶ πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ
ἀλλοιώσις τις εἶναι. φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον
417a1 ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς δυνατὸν ἢ
ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου λόγοις περὶ
τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν διὰ τί καὶ
τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν οὐ γίνεται αἴσθησις, καὶ
διὰ τί ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω οὐ ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνότος
417a5 πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἔστιν
ἢ αἴσθησις καθ' αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις.
δηλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργεία,
ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον, διὸ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ
τὸ καυστὸν οὐ καίεται αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄνευ τοῦ
καυστικοῦ· ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν ἐδεῖτο τοῦ
417a10 ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
λέγομεν διχῶς (τό τε γὰρ δυνάμει ἀκοῦον καὶ ὁρῶν
ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν τύχη καθεῦδον, καὶ
τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις,
ἢ μὲν ὡς δυνάμει, ἢ δὲ ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὸ αἰσθητόν, τό τε δυνάμει ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ.
417a15 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν
καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν λέγωμεν· καὶ
γὰρ ἔστιν ἢ κινήσις ἐνεργείᾳ τις, ἀτελής μέντοι,
καθάπερ ἐν ἐτέροις εἴρηται. πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ
κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος. διὸ
ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸ
417a20 τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἵπομεν· πάσχει μὲν γὰρ τὸ
ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ' ὁμοίον ἔστιν.
διαριτερόν δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας·
νῦν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι μὲν
γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιστήμῳ τι ὡς ἂν εἵπομεν ἄνθρωπον
ἐπιστήμονα ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπιστημόνων
417a25 καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην· ἔστι δ' ὡς ἤδη λέγομεν
ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικὴν· ἕκαστος
δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατὸς ἔστιν,
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὁ δ' ὅτι
βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μὴ τι κωλύση τῶν
ἔξωθεν· ὁ δ' ἤδη θεωρῶν, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὧν καὶ κυρίως
417a30 ἐπιστάμενος τότε τὸ Α. ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ
πρῶτοι, κατὰ δυνάμιν ἐπιστήμονες <όντες, ἐνεργείᾳ
γίνονται ἐπιστήμονες,> ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως
ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν
ἔξεως, ὁ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἢ τὴν
γραμματικὴν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ, εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, ἄλλον
417b1 τρόπον.

Having made these distinctions let us now speak of sensation in the widest sense. Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change of quality. Now some thinkers assert that like is affected only by like; in what sense this is possible and in what sense impossible, we have explained in our general discussion of acting and being acted upon.

Here arises a problem: why do we not perceive the senses themselves, or why without the stimulation of external objects do they not produce sensation, seeing that they contain in themselves fire, earth, and all the other elements, of which—either in themselves or in respect of their incidental attributes—there is perception? It is clear that what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually. The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise it could have set itself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it ablaze.

We use the word 'perceive' in two ways, for we say that what has the power to hear or see, 'sees' or 'hears', even though it is at the moment asleep, and also that what is actually seeing or hearing, 'sees' or 'hears'. Hence 'sense' too must have two meanings, sense potential, and sense actual. Similarly 'to be a sentient' means either to have a certain power or to manifest a certain activity. To begin with let us speak as if there were no difference between being moved or affected, and being active, for movement is a kind of activity—an imperfect kind, as has elsewhere been explained. Everything that is acted upon or moved is acted upon by an agent which is actually at work. Hence it is that in one sense, as has already been stated, what acts and what is acted upon are like, in another unlike; for the unlike is affected, and when it has been affected it is like.

But we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be potential or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have knowledge, or as when we are speaking of a man who possesses a knowledge of grammar; each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man who is already reflecting—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g. this A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise.

417b2 οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία
 417b5 μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει
 ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δυνάμις ἔχει πρὸς
 ἐντελέχειαν· θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν
 ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς
 αὐτὸ γὰρ ἢ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ
 ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιώσεως. διὸ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει
 λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅταν φρονῆ, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι,
 ὡσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῆ. τὸ
 417b10 μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγειν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος
 [κατὰ] τὸ νοοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν οὐ διδασκαλίαν
 ἀλλ' ἐτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δίκαιον· τὸ δ' ἐκ
 δυνάμει ὄντος μαθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ
 ἦτοι οὐδὲ πάσχειν φατέον, [ὡσπερ εἴρηται,] ἢ
 417b15 δύο τρόπους εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τὴν τε ἐπὶ τὰς
 στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ
 τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν. τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ ἢ μὲν
 πρώτη μεταβολὴ γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος,
 ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῆ, ἔχει ἤδη, ὡσπερ ἐπιστήμην,
 καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως
 417b20 λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν· διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ
 ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἕξωθεν, τὸ ὄρατὸν καὶ τὸ
 ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.
 αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 αἰσθησις, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου· ταῦτα δ'
 ἐν αὐτῇ πῶς ἐστὶ τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ'
 417b25 αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ'
 αὐτῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν.
 ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ἔχει καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς
 τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὰ
 αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἕξωθεν.
 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασαφήσαι καιρὸς
 417b30 γένοιτ' ἂν καὶ εἰς αὐθις· νῦν δὲ διωρίσθω
 τοσοῦτον, ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει
 λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ὡσπερ ἂν εἴπομεν
 τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατηγεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν
 418a1 ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητικόν. ἐπεὶ
 δ' ἀνώνυμος αὐτῶν ἢ διαφορά, διωρίσται δὲ
 περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ πῶς ἕτερα, χρησθαι
 ἀναγκαῖον τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὡς
 κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν. τὸ δ' αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει
 418a5 ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς
 δ' ὁμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.

Also the expression 'to be acted upon' has more than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense.

Hence it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom, just as it would be absurd to speak of a builder as being altered when he is using his skill in building a house.

What in the case of thinking or understanding leads from potentiality to actuality ought not to be called teaching but something else. That which starting with the power to know learns or acquires knowledge through the agency of one who actually knows and has the power of teaching either ought not to be said 'to be acted upon' at all—or else we must recognize two senses of alteration, viz. the change to conditions of privation, and the change to a thing's dispositions and to its nature.

In the case of what is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. But between the two cases compared there is a difference; the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a man can think when he wants to but his sensation does not depend upon himself—a sensible object must be there. A similar statement must be made about our knowledge of what is sensible—on the same ground, viz. that the sensible objects are individual and external.

A later more appropriate occasion may be found thoroughly to clear up all this. At present it must be enough to recognize the distinctions already drawn; a thing may be said to be potential in either of two senses, either in the sense in which we might say of a boy that he may become a general or in the sense in which we might say the same of an adult, and there are two corresponding senses of the term 'a potential sentient'. There are no separate names for the two stages of potentiality; we have pointed out that they are different and how they are different. We cannot help using the incorrect terms 'being acted upon or altered' of the two transitions involved. As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.

1028b33 Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ'
ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι
καὶ τὸ καθόλουκαὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι
ἐκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.
τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται,
1029a1 ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ' ἄλλον· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ
τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία
τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον. τοιοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μὲν
τινα ἢ ὕλη λέγεται, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἢ μορφῆ,
1029a5 τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων (λέγω δὲ τὴν μὲν ὕλην οἶον
τὸν χαλκόν, τὴν δὲ μορφὴν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας,
τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸ σύνολον), ὥστε
εἰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης πρότερον καὶ μᾶλλον ὄν,
καὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν πρότερον ἔσται διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ εἴρηται τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ
οὐσία, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου ἀλλὰ καθ' οὗ τὰ
ἄλλα· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως· οὐ γὰρ ἰκανόν· αὐτὸ
1029a10 γὰρ τοῦτο ἀδηλον, καὶ ἔτι ἡ ὕλη οὐσία γίγνεται.
εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὕτη οὐσία, τίς ἐστὶν ἄλλη διαφεύγει·
περιαιρουμένων γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ φαίνεται
οὐδὲν ὑπομένον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῶν σωμάτων
πάθη καὶ ποιήματα καὶ δυνάμεις, τὸ δὲ μήκος
καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ποσότητές τινες ἀλλ' οὐκ
1029a15 οὐσίαι (τὸ γὰρ ποσὸν οὐκ οὐσία), ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὧ
ὑπάρχει ταῦτα πρῶτον, ἐκεῖνό ἐστὶν οὐσία. ἀλλὰ
μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους
οὐδὲν ὀρώμεν ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τί ἐστὶ τὸ
ὀριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων, ὥστε τὴν ὕλην ἀνάγκη
φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν οὕτω σκοπουμένοις.
1029a20 λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τί μήτε ποσὸν
μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὄρισται τὸ ὄν. ἔστι
γὰρ τι καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον,
ὧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐκάστη
(τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται,
αὕτη δὲ τῆς ὕλης), ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθ' αὐτὸ
1029a25 οὔτε τί οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐστὶν· οὐδὲ
δὴ αἰ ἀποφάσεις, καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι
κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι
συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ· καὶ
γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ
μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν
1029a30 οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. τὴν μὲν
τοῖνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τε τῆς
ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ
δήλη· φανερὰ δὲ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη· περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης
σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.

The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which other things are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third sense, the compound of these. By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the plan of its form, and by the compound of these (the concrete thing) the statue. Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, it will be prior to the compound also for the same reason.

We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it is beyond us to say what else is. When all else is taken away evidently nothing but matter remains. For of the other elements some are affections, products, and capacities of bodies, while length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances. For a quantity is not a substance; but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left except that which is bounded by these, whatever it be; so that to those who consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, so that its being is different from that of each of the predicates; for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter. Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet negatively, for negations also will belong to it only by accident.

For those who adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter. The substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most difficult.

Metaphysics 7.3 (cont.)

1029a33 ὁμολογοῦνται δ' οὐσίαι εἶναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν
τινές, ὥστε ἐν ταύταις ζητητέον πρῶτον. πρὸ
ἔργου γὰρ τὸ μεταβαίνειν εἰς τὸ γνωριμώτερον.
ἢ γὰρ μάθησις οὕτω γίγνεται πᾶσι διὰ τῶν
1029b5 ἤττον γνωρίμων φύσει εἰς τὰ γνώριμα μᾶλλον·
καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστω ἀγαθῶν τὰ ὅλως
ἀγαθὰ ἐκάστω ἀγαθὰ, οὕτως ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶ
γνωριμωτέρων τὰ τῇ φύσει γνώριμα αὐτῶ
γνώριμα. τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα
1029b10 πολλάκις ἡρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα, καὶ μικρὸν ἢ
οὐθὲν ἔχει τοῦ ὄντος· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐκ τῶν φαύλων
μὲν γνωστῶν αὐτῶ δὲ γνωστῶν τὰ ὅλως γνωστὰ
γινῶναι πειρατέον, μεταβαίνοντας, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται, διὰ τούτων αὐτῶν.

It is agreed that there are some substances among sensible things, so that we must look first among these. For it is in an advantage to advance to that which is more intelligible. For learning proceeds for all in this way—through that which is less intelligible by nature to that which is more intelligible; and just as in conduct our work is to start from what is good for each and make what is good in itself good for each, so it is our work to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself. Now what is intelligible and primary for particular sets of people is often intelligible to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one understands.

Metaphysics 7.6

1031a15 Πότερον δὲ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν
εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον. ἔστι γὰρ τι πρὸ
ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν
τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἐαυτοῦ οὐσίας,
καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἐκάστου οὐσία.
ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
1031a20 δόξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος
ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῶ ἄνθρωπῳ εἶναι (εἰ γὰρ
τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῶ
ἄνθρωπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ
λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῶ
ἄνθρωπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπῳ· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὅσα
1031a25 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι ταυτά, οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως
τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεται ταυτά· ἀλλ' ἴσως γε ἐκείνο
δόξειεν ἂν συμβαίνειν, τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταυτά
τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκῶ εἶναι καὶ
τὸ μουσικῶ· δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ
λεγομένων ἄρ' ἀνάγκη ταυτὸ εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινας
1031a30 εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ
φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἷας φασὶ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι
τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
ἀγαθῶ εἶναι, καὶ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ζῶον, καὶ τὸ ὄντι
1031b1 καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ
ἰδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι
ἐκείναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν.

We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.

Now in the case of things with accidental attributes the two would be generally thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man. For if they are the same, the essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for a man and a white man are the same, as people say, so that the essence of white man and that of man would be also the same. But probably it is not necessary that things with accidental attributes should be the same. For the extreme terms are not in the same way the same.—Perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case.

But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily the same as its essence? E.g. if there are some substances which have no other substances nor entities prior to them—substances such as some assert the Ideas to be? If the essence of good is to be different from the Idea of good, and the essence of animal from the Idea of animal, and the essence of being from the Idea of being, there will, firstly, be other substances and entities and Ideas besides those which are asserted, and, secondly, these others will be prior substances if the essence is substance.

1031b3 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμένα ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν οὐκ
 ἔσται ἐπιστήμη τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα (λέγω δὲ τὸ
 ἀπολελυθῆναι εἰ μήτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ
 εἶναι ἀγαθῷ μήτε τούτῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν). ἐπιστήμη
 τε γὰρ ἐκάστου ἔστιν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι
 γινώσκωμεν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔχει,
 ὥστε εἰ μὴδὲ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ὄντι
 ὄν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐνὶ ἔν· ὁμοίως δὲ πάντα ἔστιν ἢ οὐθὲν τὰ
 1031b10 τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥστ' εἰ μὴδὲ τὸ ὄντι ὄν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων
 οὐδέν. ἔτι ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀγαθόν.
 ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι
 καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο
 λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
 1031b15 ἰκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχη, κἂν μὴ ἦ εἶδη, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως κἂν
 ἦ εἶδη (ἅμα δὲ δηλὸν καὶ ὅτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι οἷας
 τινὲς φασιν, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία· ταύτας
 γὰρ οὐσίας μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου
 δέ· ἔσονται γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν). —ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων
 τῶν λόγων ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ
 1031b20 ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
 ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε
 καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἀνάγκη ἐν τι εἶναι ἄμφω (τὸ
 δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ
 λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς
 1031b25 ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε
 λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὥστ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν,
 ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν
 γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό,
 τῷ πάθει δὲ ταὐτό). ἄτοπον δ' ἂν φανείη κἂν εἴ τις
 ἐκάστῳ ὄνομα θεῖτο τῶν τί ἦν εἶναι· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ
 1031b30 παρ' ἐκείνο ἄλλο, οἷον τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι ἵππῳ τί ἦν
 εἶναι [ἵππῳ] ἕτερον. καίτοι τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν εἶναι
 ἕνα εὐθὺς τί ἦν εἶναι, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι;
 1032a1 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ μόνον ἐν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς
 αὐτῶν, ὡς δηλὸν καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ
 συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τὸ ἐν εἶναι καὶ ἐν. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο ἔσται,
 εἰς ἄπειρον εἰσὶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται τί ἦν εἶναι τοῦ
 ἐνός τὸ δὲ τὸ ἐν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται
 1032a5 λόγος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ
 λεγομένων τὸ ἐκάστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
 ἐν ἔστι, δηλὸν· οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι πρὸς τὴν
 θέσιν ταύτην φανερόν ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ λύονται λύσει καὶ
 εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτει εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ
 1032a10 διαφέρει οὔτε ἐξ ὧν ἐρωτήσκειν ἂν τις οὔτε ἐξ ὧν
 λύων ἐπιτύχοι. πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ταὐτόν καὶ
 πῶς οὐ ταὐτόν ἐκάστῳ, εἴρηται.

And if the posterior substances are severed from one another, there will be no knowledge of the ones and the others will have no being. (By 'severed' I mean, if the Idea of good has not the essence of good, and the latter has not the property of being good.) For there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence. And the case is the same for other things as for the good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither will the essence of being be, nor the essence of unity be one. And all essences alike exist or none of them does; so that if the essence of being is not, neither will any of the others be. Again, that which has not the property of being good is not good. The good, then, must be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary. For it is enough if they are this, even if there are no Forms; and perhaps all the more if there are Forms.—At the same time it is clear that if there are Ideas such as some people say there are, the substratum of them will not be substance; for these must be substances, and not predicable of a substratum; for if they were they would exist only by being participated in.—Each thing then and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.

(But of an accidental term, e.g. 'the musical' or 'the white', since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence; for both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man or the white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.)

The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be another essence besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse there will belong a second essence. Yet why should not some things be their essences from the start, since essence is substance? But not only are a thing and its essence one, but the formula of them is also the same, as is clear even from what has been said; for it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one. Further, if they were different, the process would go on to infinity; for we should have the essence of one, and the one, so that in their case also the same infinite regress would be found. Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence.

Now the sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered in the same way; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. We have explained, then, in what sense each thing is the same as its essence and in what sense it is not.

1041a7 Τί δὲ χρῆ λέγειν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι τὴν οὐσίαν,
 πάλιν ἄλλην οἶον ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν·
 ἴσως γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἔσται δῆλον καὶ περὶ ἐκείνης
 τῆς οὐσίας ἣτις ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν
 οὐσιῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ οὐσία ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τις
 ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν μετιτέον. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί
 αἰεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλω τινὶ ὑπάρχει. τὸ
 γὰρ ζητεῖν διὰ τί ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος μουσικὸς
 ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἥτοι ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον ζητεῖν,
 διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος μουσικός ἐστιν, ἢ ἄλλο. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτό, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ζητεῖν
 1041a15 (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν δῆλα ὄντα
 – λέγω δ' οἶον ὅτι ἡ σελήνη ἐκλείπει –, αὐτὸ δὲ
 ὅτι αὐτό, εἰς λόγος καὶ μία αἰτία ἐπὶ πάντων,
 διὰ τί ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ μουσικὸς
 μουσικός, πλὴν εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς
 αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἐνὶ εἶναι· ἀλλὰ
 1041a20 τοῦτο κοινὸν γε κατὰ πάντων καὶ σύντομον·
 ζητήσῃε δ' ἂν τις διὰ τί ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῶον
 τοιονδί. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ ζητεῖ διὰ
 τί ὅς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν· τί ἄρα
 κατὰ τίνος ζητεῖ διὰ τί ὑπάρχει (ὅτι δ' ὑπάρχει,
 δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, οὐδὲν ζητεῖ),
 1041a25 οἶον διὰ τί βροντᾶ; διὰ τί ψόφος γίγνεται ἐν
 τοῖς νέφεσιν; ἄλλο γὰρ οὕτω κατ' ἄλλου ἐστὶ
 τὸ ζητούμενον. καὶ διὰ τί ταδί, οἶον πλίνθοι καὶ
 λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ
 αἴτιον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν
 λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἐστὶ τίνος ἕνεκα,
 1041a30 οἶον ἴσως ἐπ' οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τί
 ἐκίνησε πρῶτον· αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν τοιοῦτον αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται
 καὶ φθειρέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.
 λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν τοῖς μὴ
 κατ' ἀλλήλων λεγομένοις, οἶον ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστὶ
 ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ διορίζειν
 ὅτι τάδε τόδε. ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας ζητεῖν·
 εἰ δὲ μή, κοινὸν τοῦ μὴτὲν ζητεῖν καὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν
 1041b5 τι γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ
 εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ἕλλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τι>
 ἐστίν· οἶον οἰκία ταδί διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν
 οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο
 τοδί ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ἕλης
 (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ᾧ τί ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' ἡ
 οὐσία. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν οὐκ
 1041b10 ἔστι ζήτησις οὐδὲ διδασίς, ἀλλ' ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς
 ζητήσεως τῶν τοιούτων.

We should say what, and what sort of thing, substance is, taking another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause, let us attack it from this standpoint. The 'why' is always sought in this form—'why does one thing attach to another?' For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire—as we have said—why the man is musical, or it is something else. Now 'why a thing is itself' is doubtless a meaningless inquiry; for the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident (e.g. that the moon is eclipsed), but the fact that a thing is itself is the single formula and the single cause to all such questions as why the man is man, or the musical musical, unless one were to say that each thing is inseparable from itself; and its being one just meant this. This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question. But we can inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. Here, then, we are evidently not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something; that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing. E.g. why does it thunder?—why is sound produced in the clouds? Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are certain things, i.e. stones and bricks, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is that for the sake of which, e.g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also.

The object of the inquiry is most overlooked where one term is not expressly predicated of another (e.g. when we inquire why man is), because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely 'why do these parts form this whole?' But we must distinguish the elements before we begin to inquire; if not, it is not clear whether the inquiry is significant or unmeaning. Since we must know the existence of the thing and it must be given, clearly the question is why the matter is some individual thing, e.g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing, or this body in this state, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i.e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. Evidently, then, in the case of simple things no inquiry nor teaching is possible; but we must inquire into them in a different way.

Metaphysics 7.17 (cont.)

1041b11 —ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τινος σύνθετον οὕτως ὥστε ἐν εἶναι
τὸ πᾶν, [ἄν] μὴ ὡς σωρὸς ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ συλλαβὴ —ἡ
δὲ συλλαβὴ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐδὲ τῶ <βα>
1041b15 (διαλυθέντων γὰρ τὰ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔστιν, οἶον ἡ σὰρξ
καὶ ἡ συλλαβή, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ πῦρ
καὶ ἡ γῆ)· ἔστιν ἄρα τι ἡ συλλαβή, οὐ μόνον τὰ
στοιχεῖα τὸ φωνῆεν καὶ ἄφωνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν
τι, καὶ ἡ σὰρξ οὐ μόνον πῦρ καὶ γῆ ἢ τὸ θερμὸν
καὶ ψυχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερόν τι —εἰ τοῖνυν ἀνάγκη
1041b20 κἀκείνο ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείων εἶναι, εἰ μὲν
στοιχεῖον, πάλιν ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος (ἐκ τούτου
γὰρ καὶ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ἔσται ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλου,
ὥστ' εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιέται)· εἰ δὲ ἐκ στοιχείου,
δηλον ὅτι οὐχ ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ πλειόνων, ἢ ἐκείνο αὐτὸ
ἔσται, ὥστε πάλιν ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν αὐτὸν ἐροῦμεν
1041b25 λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ συλλαβῆς. δόξειε δ' ἂν
εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ στοιχεῖον, καὶ αἰτιὸν γε τοῦ
εἶναι τοδὶ μὲν σάρκα τοδὶ δὲ συλλαβὴν· ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐσία δὲ ἐκάστου μὲν τοῦτο
(τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον πρῶτον τοῦ εἶναι) —ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνια
οὐκ οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ' ὅσαι οὐσίαι, κατὰ
1041b30 φύσιν καὶ φύσει συνεστήκασιν, φανείη ἂν [καὶ] αὕτη
ἢ φύσις οὐσία, ἢ ἔστιν οὐ στοιχεῖον ἀλλ' ἀρχή —
στοιχεῖον δ' ἔστιν εἰς ὃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχον ὡς
ὑλην, οἶον τῆς συλλαβῆς τὸ <α> καὶ τὸ <β>.

As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one—not like a heap, however, but like a syllable,—the syllable is not its elements, ba is not the same as b and a, nor is flesh fire and earth; for when they are dissolved the wholes, i.e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth. The syllable, then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else. Since, then, that something must be either an element or composed of elements, if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still further, so that the process will go on to infinity; while if it is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of many (or else it will itself be that one), so that again in this case we can use the same argument as in the case of flesh or of the syllable. But it would seem that this is something, and not an element, and that it is the cause which makes this thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the substance of each thing; for this is the primary cause of its being; and since, while some things are not substances, as many as are substances are formed naturally and by nature, their substance would seem to be this nature, which is not an element but a principle. An element is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter, e.g. a and b are the elements of the syllable.

Metaphysics 8.6

1045a27 Περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας τῆς εἰρημένης περί τε τοὺς
ὀρισμοὺς καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς, τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν
εἶναι; πάντων γὰρ ὅσα πλείω μέρη ἔχει καὶ μὴ
ἔστιν οἶον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ' ἔστι τι τὸ ὅλον παρὰ
τὰ μόρια, ἔστι τι αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι
τοῖς μὲν ἀφή αἰτία τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ γλισχρότης
ἢ τι πάθος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. ὁ δ' ὀρισμὸς λόγος
ἔστιν εἰς οὐ συνδέσμων καθάπερ ἡ Ἰλιάς ἀλλὰ τῶ
ἑνὸς εἶναι. τί οὖν ἔστιν ὃ ποιεῖ ἐν τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
1045a15 καὶ διὰ τί ἐν ἀλλ' οὐ πολλά, οἶον τό τε ζῶον καὶ
τὸ δίπουν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ φασί
τινες, αὐτό τι ζῶον καὶ αὐτὸ δίπουν; διὰ τί γὰρ οὐκ
ἐκείνα αὐτὰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔστι, καὶ ἔσονται κατὰ
μέθεξιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οὐδ' ἑνὸς ἀλλὰ
δυοῖν, ζῶον καὶ δίποδος, καὶ ὅλως δὴ οὐκ ἂν
1045a20 εἶη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀλλὰ πλείω, ζῶον καὶ δίπουν;

To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect to definitions and numbers, what is the cause of the unity of each of them? In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the whole is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the totality is something besides the parts, there is a cause of unity; for as regards material things contact is the cause in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition is a formula which is one not by being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.—What then is it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, e.g. animal—biped, especially if there are, as some say, an ideal animal and an ideal biped? Why are not those Ideas the ideal man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in one Idea, but in two, animal and biped? And in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped.

1045a20 φανερόν δὴ ὅτι οὕτω μὲν μειοῦσιν ὡς εἰώθασιν
 ὀρίζεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἀποδοῦναι καὶ
 λῦσαι τὴν ἀπορίαν· εἰ δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν,
 1045a25 τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή, καὶ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ
 δὲ ἐνεργεία, οὐκέτι ἀπορία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ
 ζητούμενον. ἔστι γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀπορία ἢ αὕτη κἄν
 εἰ ὁ ὅρος εἴη ἱματίου στρογγύλος χαλκός· εἴη
 γὰρ ἂν σημεῖον τοῦνομα τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὥστε
 τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι τί αἴτιον τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὸ
 1045a30 στρογγύλον καὶ τὸν χαλκόν. οὐκέτι δὲ ἀπορία
 φαίνεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ μορφή. τί οὖν
 τούτου αἴτιον, τοῦ τὸ δυνάμει ὄν ἐνεργεία εἶναι,
 παρὰ τὸ ποιῆσαν, ἐν ὅσοις ἔστι γέनेσις; οὐθὲν
 γὰρ ἐστὶν αἴτιον ἕτερον τοῦ τὴν δυνάμει σφαίραν
 ἐνεργεία εἶναι σφαίραν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ τί ἦν
 1045a35 εἶναι ἑκατέρω. ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἢ μὲν νοητῆ ἢ
 δ' αἰσθητῆ, καὶ αἰεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ
 ἐνεργεία ἐστὶν, οἷον ὁ κύκλος σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον.
 ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει ὕλην μήτε νοητὴν μήτε αἰσθητὴν,
 1045b1 εὐθὺς ὅπερ ἐν τί [εἶναι] ἐστὶν ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ
 ὅπερ ὄν τι, τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν — διὸ καὶ
 οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς ὀρισμοῖς οὔτε τὸ ὄν οὔτε τὸ
 εἶναι —, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι εὐθὺς ἐν τί ἐστὶν ὥσπερ
 καὶ ὄν τι — διὸ καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερόν τι αἴτιον τοῦ
 1045b5 ἐν εἶναι οὐθενὶ τούτων οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄν τι εἶναι· εὐθὺς
 γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστὶν ὄν τι καὶ εἶναι τι, οὐχ ὡς ἐν γένει
 τῶ ὄντι καὶ τῶ ἐνί, οὐδ' ὡς χωριστῶν ὄντων παρὰ
 τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν οἱ μὲν
 μέθεξιν λέγουσι, καὶ αἴτιον τί τῆς μεθέξεως καὶ τί
 1045b10 τὸ μετέχειν ἀποροῦσιν· οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν [ψυχῆς],
 ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων φησὶν εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ
 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ψυχῆς· οἱ δὲ σύνθεσιν ἢ σύνδεσμον
 ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν. καίτοι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ
 πάντων· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἔσται ἢ συνουσία ἢ
 1045b15 σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνθεσις ψυχῆς καὶ ὑγείας, καὶ τὸ
 τὸν χαλκὸν εἶναι τρίγωνον σύνθεσις χαλκοῦ καὶ
 τριγώνου, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι σύνθεσις ἐπιφανείας
 καὶ λευκότητος. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι δυνάμεως καὶ
 ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἐνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν.
 ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἢ μορφή
 1045b20 τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ ἐνός τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι· ἐν
 γὰρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεία ἐν
 πῶς ἐστὶν, ὥστε αἴτιον οὐθὲν ἄλλο πλὴν εἴ τι ὡς
 κινήσαν ἐκ δυνάμεως εἰς ἐνεργείαν. ὅσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει
 ὕλην, πάντα ἀπλῶς ὅπερ ἐν τι.

Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of cloak; for this name would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of round and bronze? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What then is the cause of this—the reason why that which was potentially is actually,—what except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent? For there is no other reason why the potential sphere becomes actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either. Of matter some is the object of reason, some of sense, and part of the formula is always matter and part is actuality, e.g. the circle is a figure which is plane. But of the things which have no matter, either for reason or for sense, each is by its nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being—a 'this', a quality, or a quantity. And so neither 'existent' nor 'one' is present in definitions, and an essence is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being. This is why none of these has any reason outside itself for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in the genus 'being' or 'one' nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.

Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of participation, and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate; and others speak of communion, as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul; and others say life is a composition or connexion of soul with body. Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being healthy will be either a communion or a connexion or a composition of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a composition of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a composition of surface and whiteness.—The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potentiality and actuality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, the other actually. Therefore to ask the cause of their being one is like asking the cause of unity in general; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potentiality into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities.

1074b15 Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ
 μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δ'
 ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε
 γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλ' ἔχει
 ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δ' ἄλλο
 κύριον, οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τούτο ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐσία
 1074b20 νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη·
 διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ἔτι δὲ
 εἴτε νοῦς ἢ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησις ἐστὶ, τί νοεῖ;
 ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι· καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι,
 ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ
 οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον
 1074b25 τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ
 θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει·
 εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἢ μεταβολή, καὶ κινήσις τις ἤδη
 τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν
 ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὐλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς
 1074b30 αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν
 εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον. καὶ γὰρ
 τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χειρίστον
 νοοῦντι, ὡστ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄραν
 ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὄραν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀριστον ἢ
 νόησις. αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον,
 1074b35 καὶ ἐστὶν ἢ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. φαίνεται δ'
 αἰεὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα
 καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο
 τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ
 εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῦτ' ὅτι εἶναι νοήσει καὶ
 1075a1 νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπ' ἐνίων ἢ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἐπὶ
 μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἢ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν
 εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα
 καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου
 καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ,
 1075a5 καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. ἔτι δὴ λείπεται
 ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι
 γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν
 τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην — ὡσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ
 ὃ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἐν τινι χρόνῳ (οὐ γὰρ
 ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῷδὶ ἢ ἐν τῷδί, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ
 1075a10 ἀριστον, ὃν ἄλλο τι) — οὕτως δ' ἔχει αὐτὴ αὐτῆς
 ἢ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;

The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems; for while thought is held to be the most divine of phenomena, the question what it must be in order to have that character involves difficulties. For if it thinks nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (as that which is its substance is not the act of thinking, but a capacity) it cannot be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it. Further, whether its substance is the faculty of thought or the act of thinking, what does it think? Either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same always or something different. Does it matter, then, or not, whether it thinks the good or any chance thing? Are there not some things about which it is incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First, then, if it is not the act of thinking but a capacity, it would be reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently be something else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought. For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who has the worst of thoughts. Therefore if this ought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.

But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For being an act of thinking and being an object of thought are not the same. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences (if we abstract from the matter) the substance in the sense of essence, and in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object. As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.

A further question is left—whether the object of the thought is composite; for if it were, thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole. We answer that everything which has not matter is indivisible. As human thought, or rather the thought of composite objects, is in a certain period of time (for it does not possess the good at this moment or at that, but its best, being something different from it, is attained only in a whole period of time), so throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for its object.