TOWARD PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMON SENSE: HUSSERL AND SCHÜTZ
In this paper, I will examine the possibility and the limits of a phenomenological account of common sense. As a starting point, I will consider the philosophy of common sense that originated in the works of Moore and Wittgenstein and was developed by Oxford philosophers as a challenge to phenomenology.
If phenomenology is devoted to the analysis of the structures in subjective experience, what role in it can be accorded to common sense that is understood to be taken-for-granted knowledge as well as a social and moral phenomenon? Is it possible to conceive a phenomenology that is open to a larger subjectivity, giving access to common sense without desocializing or demoralizing it? It is in the Husserlian life-world theory, I will show, that we can identify the first steps taken toward a phenomenology of common sense. Finally, I will examine the consequences of the shift to common sense as it was accomplished by the social phenomenology of Alfred Schütz.