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I think that you found a really important insight about naming when you pointed out that the use of “Glunk” names decouples the co-operative problem of choosing a canonical name from the constraints and/or desiderata of other uses of language. The true force of the particular norm “Q” is not all that important to the insight. Every norm/constraint/desideratum derived from the descriptive meaning of language (or perhaps other concerns distinct from those to do with naming) is likely to collide with the norms of naming in some cases. Even the antithesis of Q could complicate the naming task.
I notice that similar conflicts arise in many informational phenomena, and are often resolved in a similar way. “Junk” DNA is particularly useful for identifying an organism, since it is not constrained by a physiological function and is therefore not affected much by natural selection. The law on trade names (not at all the same as copyright) makes whimsical names much easier to defend than names that might have been used descriptively by a reasonable disinterested party (e.g., it’s easier to defend the name “Glunk” to identify a brand of chicken than the name “Poultry”.) The Domain Name System on the Internet is plagued by social, legal, criminal, and all sorts of struggle to control attractive names (“sex.com” was actually stolen through a criminal forgery—the thief made millions and skipped the country before being convicted of the forgery), which interfere with the use of domain names just as permanent identifiers. I have proposed adding an alternative set of names that look like random numbers for those who need a robust identifier and don’t care to defend a contentious name. In other areas of computers science, it is very common to introduce arbitrary numerical codes for identities behind the scenes to resolve conflicts between different intuitive uses of names (e.g., variable names in programming languages are usually mapped to invisible arbitrary integers by the compiler).
That was a fascinating talk. It’s changing the way I think about names.
Here is a naive thought I had the other day: perhaps your view takes care of the problem of negative existentials. For there isn’t anything unusual about statements like “Unicorns don’t exist”–in Frege-ese that becomes something like “The concept ‘is a unicorn’ has an empty extension.” Only negative existentials which feature logically proper names (like “Santa Claus doesn’t exist”) pose a problem. But if “Santa Claus” is a predicate, then perhaps Santa Claus sentences are no different from unicorn sentences.
Mike: You’re probably right that (Q) doesn’t have unique status with respect to this problem – other norms might also interfere with the coordination strategy involved in developing canonical modes of reference. I mentioned (Q) because philosophers take it – or something like it – to be a fundamental norm which governs communication. That there is a default presupposition that speakers typically obey (Q) defines the space in which the kind of rational interaction that conversation is can take place.
I like the example of junk DNA. It is like the converse of the claim I’m making. I’m claiming: if you want some way of identifying an object, you should isolate the procedures for generating such identification from potentially conflicting norms. Conversely: if some process is isolated from potentially conflicting norms (as the transmission of junk DNA is isolated from natural selection) it’s outputs can be used to identify objects with which they are associated (i.e. organisms)
Matt: you’re right to point out that the predicate view of names has some interesting consequences for the problem of negative existentials. Those consequences will be the subject of a latter chapter of the dissertation. The situation is not quite as simple as you state it, though. According to the predicate view, names are basically analogous to incomplete definite descriptions. Definite descriptions do have a presupposition of existence, so there is still a question about negative existentials. Under what conditions are we allowed to violate that presupposition? Under what conditions could I sensibly say something like ‘The president does not exist’ ? What exactly would I then be taken to assert?
May 12th, 2009 at 9:43 pm
I think that you found a really important insight about naming when you pointed out that the use of “Glunk” names decouples the co-operative problem of choosing a canonical name from the constraints and/or desiderata of other uses of language. The true force of the particular norm “Q” is not all that important to the insight. Every norm/constraint/desideratum derived from the descriptive meaning of language (or perhaps other concerns distinct from those to do with naming) is likely to collide with the norms of naming in some cases. Even the antithesis of Q could complicate the naming task.
I notice that similar conflicts arise in many informational phenomena, and are often resolved in a similar way. “Junk” DNA is particularly useful for identifying an organism, since it is not constrained by a physiological function and is therefore not affected much by natural selection. The law on trade names (not at all the same as copyright) makes whimsical names much easier to defend than names that might have been used descriptively by a reasonable disinterested party (e.g., it’s easier to defend the name “Glunk” to identify a brand of chicken than the name “Poultry”.) The Domain Name System on the Internet is plagued by social, legal, criminal, and all sorts of struggle to control attractive names (“sex.com” was actually stolen through a criminal forgery—the thief made millions and skipped the country before being convicted of the forgery), which interfere with the use of domain names just as permanent identifiers. I have proposed adding an alternative set of names that look like random numbers for those who need a robust identifier and don’t care to defend a contentious name. In other areas of computers science, it is very common to introduce arbitrary numerical codes for identities behind the scenes to resolve conflicts between different intuitive uses of names (e.g., variable names in programming languages are usually mapped to invisible arbitrary integers by the compiler).
May 19th, 2009 at 11:04 am
That was a fascinating talk. It’s changing the way I think about names.
Here is a naive thought I had the other day: perhaps your view takes care of the problem of negative existentials. For there isn’t anything unusual about statements like “Unicorns don’t exist”–in Frege-ese that becomes something like “The concept ‘is a unicorn’ has an empty extension.” Only negative existentials which feature logically proper names (like “Santa Claus doesn’t exist”) pose a problem. But if “Santa Claus” is a predicate, then perhaps Santa Claus sentences are no different from unicorn sentences.
May 22nd, 2009 at 4:18 pm
Hi Mike and Matt,
Thanks for the comments.
Mike: You’re probably right that (Q) doesn’t have unique status with respect to this problem – other norms might also interfere with the coordination strategy involved in developing canonical modes of reference. I mentioned (Q) because philosophers take it – or something like it – to be a fundamental norm which governs communication. That there is a default presupposition that speakers typically obey (Q) defines the space in which the kind of rational interaction that conversation is can take place.
I like the example of junk DNA. It is like the converse of the claim I’m making. I’m claiming: if you want some way of identifying an object, you should isolate the procedures for generating such identification from potentially conflicting norms. Conversely: if some process is isolated from potentially conflicting norms (as the transmission of junk DNA is isolated from natural selection) it’s outputs can be used to identify objects with which they are associated (i.e. organisms)
Matt: you’re right to point out that the predicate view of names has some interesting consequences for the problem of negative existentials. Those consequences will be the subject of a latter chapter of the dissertation. The situation is not quite as simple as you state it, though. According to the predicate view, names are basically analogous to incomplete definite descriptions. Definite descriptions do have a presupposition of existence, so there is still a question about negative existentials. Under what conditions are we allowed to violate that presupposition? Under what conditions could I sensibly say something like ‘The president does not exist’ ? What exactly would I then be taken to assert?
Aidan